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ABSTRACT 
 
Anatomy education by cadaveric dissection teaches medical students not only the 
formal curriculum in human anatomy, but also a ‘hidden curriculum’ whereby they 
learn the attitudes, identities and behaviours expected of doctors. While dissection 
has been investigated as a challenge to and training in emotional regulation, little 
attention has been paid hitherto to the forms of medical knowledge and identity 
which students encounter and develop in the dissection room. This study analyses a 
corpus of 119 tributes written by three consecutive cohorts of first-year medical 
students at the University of [deleted] to their cadaveric donors. We employ a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis methodology, seeking to elucidate the features of the 
subject position, the narrative ‘I’ or ‘we’ of the tributes, and the modes of knowledge 
which operate between that subject position and its object, the donor. We observe 
that students find themselves in a transitional state between personal and scientific 
modes of knowledge of the human, which correspond to different models of the 
subject position occupied by the student. While in many tributes these modes exist 
in an uneasy disjunction, others employ creative reflection to suggest new modes of 
knowledge and identity which may inform ethical practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
   The practice of human cadaveric dissection as a means of teaching anatomy to 
medical students has a long history.1 While newer pedagogical methods have 
recently been adopted by many medical schools and time dedicated to anatomy 
teaching has been progressively reduced as more recent biomedical disciplines have 
become increasingly central to clinical practice, traditional dissection remains 
widespread globally, and there is vigorous debate over its merits.2 Among the 
arguments proposed by its defenders is the claim that dissection teaches much more 
than anatomical science: it also acts as a crucial formative experience for 
professional identity.3, 4, 5 Dissection is thus a significant mediator of the so-called 
‘hidden curriculum’, which operates alongside the formal curriculum to shape the 
attitudes, identities and behaviours of future doctors.6, 7, 8 
   While there has been considerable interest in hidden or paracurricular dimensions 
of dissection, previous studies have focused on the emotional impact on students of 
encountering and cutting into a dead body for the first time, and the strategies 
adopted to regulate these emotions. Two broad approaches may be discerned in the 
literature. First, many studies adopt a psychological approach which explores 
students’ anxieties and delineates ‘coping strategies’ developed in response.9, 10, 11 
Such studies commonly point to an attitude of scientific detachment or 
depersonalisation adopted as a means of emotional regulation, and suggest that this 
may be a precursor to the ‘detached concern’ of the medical professional.3, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16 
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   The second approach adopted in the literature situates the individual within the 
social context of dissection as practice and institution.17, 18, 19 These studies suggest 
that mechanisms of emotional regulation are not elaborated by the individual in 
isolation, but rather transmitted through discourses which surround the practice of 
dissection. For instance, Daniel A. Segal suggests that dissection represents one of a 
series of ‘trials’ in which medical students encounter and subdue their emotions 
about the human body.18 The ‘cadaver story’ observed by Frederic W. Hafferty in 
1988 (a genre of practical joke utilising cadaveric body parts) explicitly dramatised 
the distressing transgression of taboos which occurs in the dissection room, as well 
as the overcoming of such emotional responses via detachment and humour.19 Such 
transgressive practices are less prevalent in modern educational dissection, which 
tends to posit the relation to the cadaver as the student’s introduction to 
‘professionalism’, a network of institutions and relations designed to regulate 
individual behaviour and response.20, 21, 22, 23 Dissection emerges as a pedagogy of 
‘feeling rules’ for the emotional labour of a medical career.24 
   The literature to date suggests, then, that one paracurricular effect of dissection is 
the production of doctors skilled in managing as professionals their emotional 
responses to nudity, death and cutting into the human body. However, far less 
attention has been paid to a second important potential effect: the introduction of 
students into regimes of medical knowledge. Michel Foucault argued that modern 
medicine represents not only a set of institutions, practices and technologies, but 
also a ‘discourse’ - a distinctive body of statements governed by a coherent set of 
rules.25 These rules are organised around a characteristically medical construct of 
truth, understood as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
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distribution, circulation, and operation of statements.”26 Thus statements can be 
recognised to belong to the discourse of medicine, to constitute true medical 
knowledge, insofar as they are organised by a medical truth-construct, whereas (say) 
historical knowledge is organised by a distinct historical truth-construct. The criteria 
that a medical statement must meet to be recognised as ‘true’ (for example, citing 
quantitative evidence produced in accord with recognised experimental and 
statistical protocols) are quite different from those a historical statement must meet 
(which may entail reference to documentary evidence, theoretical models of 
causality and so forth). 
   The Foucauldian model further suggests that the rules of discourse produce not 
only statements, but also their speakers, understood structurally as the linguistic and 
institutional subject-functions of statements. “I” am not independent of what I say, 
but produce myself through my statements, for example as a “doctor” or a 
“historian”. We become who we are not prior to language, but precisely through the 
ways we learn to speak and to know, the discourses into which we are inserted as 
subjects. The medical subject thus emerges and recognises itself in the relations of 
medical knowledge which it is uniquely licensed to occupy. 
   Applying a Foucauldian model of subjectivity to the analysis of contemporary 
medical education, we may therefore suggest that to become a doctor is (at least in 
part) to be inserted into the subject-position of medical discourse. One element of 
the ‘hidden curriculum’ relates to learning the rules of this discourse and thereby 
becoming recognisable as a medical subject, capable of making true statements 
about (say) diagnosis or prognosis. This study undertakes a Foucauldian discourse 
analysis of tributes to cadaveric donors written by first-year medical students at the 
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University of [deleted], with the aim of investigating the hidden or paracurricular 
activity taking place in the dissection room. The [deleted] tributes offer an 
opportunity to investigate this process at an early stage, to analyse the strategies 
deployed by first-year students as they attempt to negotiate this transition. This 
study therefore attempts to address the research question: what modes of 
knowledge operate between student and donor in these texts, and what models of 
medical subjectivity do they imply? 
   The elaboration of medical knowledge in the dissection room has been tangentially 
addressed by a few previous studies. Segal argues that dissection is structured by a 
movement from initial intimidation to eventual congratulation, in which the turning 
point is the reframing of the challenge as a matter of technical competence rather 
than emotion or uncertainty: “The facts and algorithm provided by the instructors 
redefine the problem in technical terms, that is, as a question of ‘how to do 
something’ rather than a question of ‘what should be done?’”27 This process entails a 
double redefinition: the patient becomes “an object that can be known and handled 
through technical routines”, while the doctor becomes “the agent who performs 
these routines impersonally and unemotionally – that is, ‘professionally.’”28 If 
dissection inculcates ‘feeling rules’ for emotional regulation, it does so partly 
through the construction of the doctor as the subject of a pure, scientific knowledge 
which guarantees a competence equal to the challenges posed by clinical practice as 
an essentially technical discipline. As Smith and Kleinman have argued with 
reference to medical training in general, “science itself is an emotion management 
strategy”.29 The question of how knowledge is structured in our dataset thus has 
significance not only for the institution of regimes of medical knowledge of which 
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patients are the object, but also for the development of the strategies by which 
doctors construct themselves as ‘professionals’. The dissection room is perhaps the 
first place where a medical student is required to put their emotions aside and 
regard a human body as the object of technical rationality. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Dataset 
   Our dataset consists of tributes written by first-year undergraduate medical 
students at the University of [deleted] in three consecutive academic years 
(2013/14, 2014/15 and 2015/16). At [deleted], students are taught anatomy 
principally through cadaveric dissection. Students undertake two sessions of 
dissection each week for most of their first academic year in groups of six to eight. 
Each group works primarily on one donor throughout the year, guided by a purpose-
written Dissection Manual. Students are initially given minimal anonymised 
information about their donor:  age, occupation and a brief medical history. 
   Towards the end of the academic year, each group is asked to compose a short 
tribute which may be sent to the donor’s relatives. The email which students receive 
with  this request gives no formal parameters other than length; however, it does 
include the following sentence: “Your tributes are important, as they mean a great 
deal to the next of kin, therefore this is your opportunity to convey to the donor’s 
family, your appreciation and understanding of the sacrifice made by both the donor 
and their family members.” It also includes four example tributes written by 
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students in previous cohorts. Students are told that their tribute will also be 
displayed at a Committal Ceremony held in the dissection room at the end of the 
academic year, at which students and departmental staff are present, and at which 
students learn their donor’s name and (at the family’s discretion) further 
biographical information. Family members are subsequently invited to a separate 
Memorial Service in the following October. 
   For students who had undertaken dissection in 2013/14 and 2014/15, all members 
of each group were contacted by e-mail to ask for consent to use their tribute 
retrospectively. For those undertaking dissection in 2015/16, consent was sought 
prospectively at the beginning of the academic year. This difference in the procedure 
for seeking consent introduces a slight heterogeneity into the dataset, since tributes 
written in 2015/16 were composed in the knowledge that they would be read by 
researchers. In total, consent was given by 120 of 128 groups of students. One 
tribute was excluded as it had been co-authored by one of the authors [deleted], 
leaving a dataset of 119 tributes. 
   The study was approved by the University of [deleted] Human Biology Research 
Ethics Committee. As the study makes use of an existing dataset and consent was 
obtained from all participants, the only ethical issue that arises in the maintenance 
of confidentiality; this was accomplished by anonymisation. 
 
Analytic Method 
   On the basis of the Foucauldian model of the relationship between subjectivity and 
knowledge which undergirds our research question, it was decided to carry out a 
discourse analysis of the tributes.30 As Foucault emphasises, the aim of discourse 
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analysis is to “grasp the statement in the exact specificity of its occurrence; 
determine its conditions of existence…establish its correlations with other 
statements that may be connected with it, and show what other forms of statement 
it excludes.”31 A discourse analysis thus begins from close reading and attempts to 
delineate structures immanent in the text, rather than reducing the text to a product 
of authorial intention or a mirror of extradiscursive social structures. Thus a tribute 
might be read not as a reflection of its authors’ position between lay and medical 
worlds, nor as an attempt to produce certain impressions in its primary recipients 
(the donor’s relatives or friends), but rather in terms of the structures of knowledge 
which organise it. The subject and object of knowledge are analysed as functions of 
such structures. 
   Our analysis therefore began from a close reading of the 119 tributes, with a focus 
on the epistemic relation between the subject (the student) and object (the donor) 
of knowledge. The aim of the close reading was to specify the sense of terms such as 
‘know’ based on their usage in the tributes, and thereby to delineate the structure of 
knowledge in each tribute, along with its correlative subject-position. Particular 
attention was paid to two topics: first, the imagined dynamics of the flow of 
knowledge between student and donor; second, the level at which the object was 
interrogated – that is, the relation between the object and the content of 
knowledge, the donor and the true statement about them.  
   Finally, we collated and compared across the corpus of tributes. It quickly became 
apparent that many of the tributes echoed each other lexically and semantically 
when characterising the epistemic relation between student and donor, deploying a 
number of shared rhetorical resources which we have labelled ‘themes’. Examples of 
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such themes include: ‘not knowing the donor’, which was the site for reflections on 
the experience of intimately dissecting a stranger; ‘real anatomy not illustrations’, 
which asserted the superiority of cadaveric dissection over other methods of 
learning anatomy; ‘the donor as teacher’, which characterised the relationship 
between donor and student as a pedagogical one; and ‘the donor as first patient’, 
which approached the experience of dissection as the beginning of a clinical career. 
Such themes acted as hubs for convergence and divergence between tributes, which 
might deploy the same theme to radically different effect within their respective 
rhetorical economies. By mapping these strategic convergences and divergences, we 
identified overarching ‘epistemic modes’, structures of knowledge shared across 
multiple texts. However, the construct of an epistemic mode should not be taken to 
imply homogeneity, and just as several epistemic modes coexist and collide within 
the overall ecology of knowledge in the tributes, each epistemic mode itself is 
populated by multiple submodalities. 
 
Limitations and Caveats 
   Our analysis is based on a sample from one university in the UK. In consequence, 
caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions about medical identities in 
general from this sample. It was decided to sample the entirety of three academic 
years (subject to consent), allowing for extensive exploration of modes of knowledge 
in a large dataset. 
   One of the authors [deleted] is himself a former [deleted] medical student, who 
undertook dissection in the academic year 2014/15. This position inevitably means 
that he brought to the project certain preexisting interests and reflections, which 
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may have inflected his interpretation of the tributes. However, it also gives him 
greater insight into the social context from which the tributes emerge than would be 
available to an external researcher, and allows him to be confident that the issues 
we explore are indeed germane to the principal concerns of undergraduate medical 
students experiencing dissection. 
   As discussed above, the aims of the study were to analyse the modes of knowledge 
operative in the tributes, and to investigate the models of medical subjectivity 
thereby produced. We must emphasise, however, that the findings of this analysis 
cannot simply be taken as equivalent to claims about the ways in which individual 
medical students undertaking dissection know their donors, for three reasons. First, 
each tribute was produced by a group of students; it was not possible to ascertain to 
what extent each tribute was produced collaboratively or was composed by a single 
primary author. Second, the tributes were produced in the expectation that they 
would be read by multiple audiences, principally the donors’ relatives or friends: this 
expectation may have shaped both form and content. Third, we may expect certain 
phraseologies, themes and even narrative forms to circulate among each cohort and 
potentially between cohorts of medical students: the tribute is a genre with its own 
implicit rules and conventions (which may of course be parodied, bent or broken). 
Taken together, these limitations suggest that insofar as the tributes can offer any 
evidence at all about the epistemologies of medical practice, they constitute an 
archive of some of the possible resources which current [deleted] medical students 
may deploy in constructing and performing themselves as subjects of knowledge, 
rather than an exhaustive record of the developing medical subject. 
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Patient and Public Involvement 
   This research was conducted without direct patient and public involvement. The 
technical and theoretical nature of discourse analysis precluded direct involvement 
in study design and interpretation of results. However, the research question was 
informed by numerous conversations with patients which attested to a sense of 
reification as the object of medical knowledge, epistemologically distinct from the 
doctor as the knowing subject. A non-technical summary of our findings will be 
distributed to attendees at the Memorial Service for donors in future years. We 
hope this will demonstrate that donors’ generosity contributes to medical education 
beyond the acquisition of strictly anatomical knowledge. 
 
Data Availability Statement 
   It has not proved feasible to make the dataset available to other researchers due 
to issues of confidentiality. 
 
RESULTS 
 
Knowing a Person and Dissecting an Organism 
   We begin with an example of the theme of ‘not knowing the donor’, which 
appeared in 66 of 119 tributes: 
 
“It has been an inexplicably surreal experience to spend so many hours in 
intimate association with a complete stranger, to know everything and 
yet nothing about her. We do not know what myriad of little traits came 
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together to form her own individual personality, what made her into the 
person you love and remember.” (15.25) 
 
The first sentence of this quotation derives its rhetorical force from the pendular 
rhythm of antitheses, which dramatises the co-existence of two incommensurate 
potential contents of knowledge. The students know things about the donor that she 
herself probably never knew – perhaps even her cause of death – but know nothing 
of her personality, her personhood. This opposition regarding the content of 
knowledge of the donor (anatomical facts vs personality) points to a tension 
between two claims about what constitutes a human being as the object of 
knowledge: the biophysical organism or the biographical person. Importantly, this 
tribute does not suggest that the anatomical knowledge the students have gained is 
trivial or merely external; it is the result of an “intimate association”, no less inward 
than that of her family. 
   The tension between two versions of the human visible in this quotation 
corresponds to a structural tension between two epistemic modes which we will 
label ‘scientific’ and ‘personal’ knowledge. These two modes interrogate the object – 
the donor – at different levels and produce statements with different formal 
relations to her. The scientific mode is analytic, attempting to dissect the human as 
organism into its component parts ("the intricacies and minutiae of the human 
body", as tribute 16.2 has it), whereas the personal mode is synthetic, pertaining to 
the wholeness of a "personality". This structural divergence animates the second 
sentence of the quotation above. While admitting  that they do not "know" the 
"myriad of little traits" which characterise the donor as person, the students are not 
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implying  that the family knew the donor in this analytic way either, but rather as 
"personality" or "person". The sentence dramatises the difference between the 
students' analytic knowledge, which imagines the human as a collection of atomised 
facts, and the synthetic, emotional relation to a whole person they ascribe to her 
family. It is, after all, a person one loves, not a collection of traits.  
   A second aspect of the structural divergence between scientific and personal 
modes of knowledge emerges in another tribute: 
 
“Isn’t it strange that you can know someone so intimately and yet not at 
all? For months, we have been dissecting and examining, trying our best 
to learn every aspect of you, but yet, after all this time, we still know 
nothing about you. All the people you once knew, and who knew you. All 
the places you had been to, and all the memories you once held. All of 
the things you achieved, and all the things that you hoped that you 
would” (16.13) 
 
This quotation, taken from a tribute written in the form of a letter to the donor, 
displays an evident semantic and lexical homology with the quotation from tribute 
15.25 above. This time, however, the epistemological contrast is given rhetorical 
force not by antithesis but by paradox. The apparent impossibility of “know*ing+ 
someone so intimately and yet not at all” is semantically resolved only by a double 
sense of the verb “know”. The students, it is implied, have been learning that it is 
possible to know and yet not know someone, that knowledge comes in two forms 
which need not coexist. The same technique of paradox is employed in the second 
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sentence, which relies on a double sense of “you” corresponding to the double sense 
of “know”: the organism is known scientifically, and the individual is known 
personally. What constitutes the formal difference between scientific knowledge 
and personal knowledge? A hint comes in the juxtaposition between the second and 
third sentences: whereas personal knowledge is exchanged bidirectionally between 
two epistemological equals (“the people you once knew, and who knew you”), the 
students’ busy “dissecting and examining” neither seeks nor finds an answering 
effort of investigation on the part of the donor. In personal knowledge, either party 
can be subject or object of the verb ‘know’; the dynamic of scientific knowledge is 
one of strict, irreversible distinction between subject and object of knowledge as 
such, the knower and the known. When we look at a specimen under a microscope, 
it does not look back at us. The epistolary form of this tribute takes on particular 
significance in the light of this juxtaposition: its poignancy stems from the fact that 
not only will this letter never be answered, it will never be read or understood by its 
addressee. 
 
Responses to the Epistemological Gap 
   Many of the tributes, then, bear witness to a disjunction between scientific and 
personal knowledge. This tension figures in the tributes as a site of unease, as 
witnessed not only by explicit references to the “strange” or “surreal” nature of the 
disjunction between ways of knowing, but also by the attempt in some of the 
tributes to elide this disjunction by simulating a personal relationship with the 
donor: 
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“Your loved one meant a lot to us; they were an integral part of the 
team. Obviously this is not the conventional way of getting to know 
someone, and it took some getting used to, but we worked through it 
together.” (14.4) 
 
It is left unstated here who is included in “we”; but it is implied that the donor too 
felt uncomfortable getting to know the students, and had to work through this 
discomfort with them. The rhetoric of this tribute thus queasily elides the donor’s 
absence qua person in order to simulate a bidirectional personal relationship. 
 
“*W+e have strangely built a rapport with *him+…Throughout the year, we 
felt we were getting to know him better and better, and that perhaps we 
were getting closer to understanding what his life may have been like. 
The process somehow made us all feel like we were building a 
relationship with the individual, and that finally saying goodbye was an 
unexpectedly emotional event.” (16.12, emphasis added). 
 
The underlined phrases here point to the heavy rhetorical lifting required to lay 
claim to bidirectional personal knowledge (and even understanding) of the donor. 
   Other tributes respond by attempting to bridge the epistemological gap between 
personal and scientific knowledge. This is accomplished by the claim that the 
distinctive value of dissection as a means of anatomical education lies precisely in 
the way in which it yokes these two dimensions of the human, placing knowledge of 
the organism in an inescapable relation to the biographical person: 
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“…your loved one allowed us to always ground our learning in the reason 
for it – the people it affects. She will always be our first connection to 
this whenever we treat patients.” (14.20) 
 
“He taught us that anatomy is not about pictures in books, but about 
people and their lives.” (16.21) 
 
   Yet other tributes do not seek to bridge the gap between scientific and personal 
knowledge, but instead construct a third epistemic mode which we will label ‘ethical’ 
knowledge: 
 
“Although we did not know him in life, we came to know him very well 
during our sessions, learning the idiosyncracies of his body – not an ideal, 
or an illustration, but a very human body…He was more than an example 
of anatomy; he was an example of selflessness…He taught us not only 
anatomy, but truly humbling lessons of generosity, altruism and 
bravery.” (14.46). 
 
This quotation deploys the theme of ‘real anatomy, not illustrations’, typically used 
to claim that learning anatomy from dissection imparts superior understanding of 
the three-dimensional structure of the body. Here, however it is deployed in service 
of the claim that through dissection ethical (as well as anatomical) knowledge passes 
from donor to student. The nouns used to refer to the content of this knowledge 
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(“selflessness”, “generosity, altruism and bravery”) name dimensions of the human 
invisible to the scientific gaze, yet also entirely abstract and impersonal: the donor as 
such is literally ‘self-less’. All the students know about the donor’s life is that he has 
chosen to give his body to complete strangers, for reasons unknown. Yet the act of 
donation itself makes the body meaningful: it becomes the bearer of a pure 
generosity, and thereby acts as a moral exemplar and educator. 
 
Characterising Ethical Knowledge 
   How is this ethical knowledge structured? An answer to this question begins to 
emerge in the deployment in tribute 14.46 (quoted above) of another theme, ‘the 
donor as teacher’. When this theme appears in the tributes, it is typically given little 
more content than the claim that the donor acted as a superlative but ultimately 
passive learning resource: 
 
“Although we never knew him, in the hours we spent with him, he 
became our greatest teacher. We have learned the anatomy of the 
human body in a way that is unparalleled within medicine. Throughout 
the year, we grew to value the opportunity of learning from a human 
example.” (14.9) 
 
In tribute 14.46, however, it is the donor’s action, his choice to donate his body, 
which transmits knowledge. The dynamic of ethical knowledge is thus neither 
bidirectional exchange nor the observation of a passive object, but rather an active, 
generous pedagogy, a giving. Furthermore, this generosity breaches the 
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subject/object division intrinsic to scientific knowledge. The student’s relationship to 
the donor as an “example of selflessness” is quite different from that to the donor as 
an “example of anatomy”: in the latter phrase (as likewise in tribute 14.9 above), the 
term “example” can only take the sense of ‘specimen’ as a source of reified facts, 
whereas in the former it implies an ‘exemplar’ or ‘paragon’ for emulation. The same 
tribute comments elsewhere: “Throughout my medical career, I sincerely hope that I 
can come close to giving to others that same devotion and selflessness that he so 
kindly gifted to us” (14.46). In this sentence, the donor has given the students not 
(just) his body but also “devotion and selflessness”. The abstract ethical knowledge 
transmitted by the donation has a transformative effect on the students, such that 
they aspire to become like the donor. Assertions of such an effect are found in 
numerous tributes, as the following examples attest: “The experience *of dissection+ 
has given me motivation to succeed as ‘one of his students’ and emulate his selfless 
approach to life” (14.35); “...she was our role model of selfless sacrifice” (15.26); “His 
generosity exemplifies what we should all look up to and be in the future” (16.20). 
   Some of the tributes, then, make the claim that dissection is the site of active 
transmission of an ethical knowledge which transforms its recipient, as well as of 
passive observation of an anatomical knowledge which leaves the observing subject 
essentially untouched. This new ethical subjectivity is to guide the students’ future 
medical practice: 
 
“Not only will we be taking this anatomical knowledge with us, but also 
the memory that our very first patient was an extremely courageous and 
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selfless one. We will strive to achieve these same traits in our future 
work as medical professionals.” (14.42) 
 
Importantly, this tribute makes a categorical distinction between the ethical 
abstracts (“courageous and selfless”) which can be read in the act of donation, and 
the personal traits of the donor, acknowledging elsewhere that “we cannot hope to 
know what he was like in life” (14.42). Courage and selflessness are imagined not as 
characteristics of the individual but as universals which transcend the individual as 
such, passed from donor to students through the act of donation. The deployment at 
this point of the theme of ‘the donor as first patient’ suggests that the donation is 
merely one link in a chain of such ethical transmissions, from doctor to patient and 
patient to doctor. 
   This figure of ongoing transmission in tribute 14.42 acts as an implicit answer to a 
question which troubles many of the tributes: how to repay the gift of a person’s 
body? An actual transactional exchange appears impossible, not only in the 
unavailability of any commensurate act or object but also in the absence of any 
recipient. Many tributes respond to this impasse by expressing a sense of 
inadequacy: “We can only offer you our thanks, which seem insufficient in light of 
your generosity” (15.4). Some, however, suggest instead that the appropriate 
response to such a gift is not to pay it back but to pay it forward, passing on its 
benefit to future patients: “Though we will never be able to thank him personally, 
we hope that we shall be able to carry on his legacy and pay forward his sacrifice, as 
we strive to become better doctors” (15.18). In some cases, this repayment is 
envisaged as an equivalence of one kind deed for another, a transmission of actions: 
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“Like he gave to us, we aspire to give back to the ones we treat” (16.20). In other 
cases, though, the repayment consists in the attempt to transmit the ethical qualities 
modelled by the donor: 
 
“*W+e…have gained a profound appreciation for the importance of 
generosity and courage. We cannot thank you and him enough but will 
honour him in extending his demonstration of this to our future 
patients.” (14.27)  
 
Here, as in tributes 14.42 and 14.46, the experience of dissection is described as one 
of ethical transformation which finds its appropriate correlate in the attempt to 
instantiate universal qualities of “generosity and courage” in future medical practice. 
To pay the donation forward is to honour its transformative force – to become more 
like the donor, envisaged as the pedagogue of an abstract generosity. 
   Tribute 14.27 also suggests that the ethical mode of knowledge is neither synthetic 
nor analytic, but rather symbolic. The donor is interrogated neither for who he is 
globally, nor for the minutiae into which the scientific gaze can reduce him, but for 
what he represents: he provides a “demonstration” of ethical universals visible in 
but not circumscribed by the conduct of any individual. Another tribute comments: 
“*T+his remarkable donation helped us to see the extraordinary generosity of 
people” (16.27). The act of donation is here read not for what it can tell us about the 
donor’s personality, the generosity of this person, but for the abstract, universal 
“generosity of people”. A similar structure organises the epistemology of the 
following quotation: 
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“Her gift revealed to us not only the anatomical complexities of the 
human body, but the genius of life and what it is to be living…The 
wisdom she has bestowed will resonate through us to the many 
thousands of patients we will encounter, who will thus also be indebted 
to her.” (16.19) 
 
The somewhat overheated rhetoric of this tribute implies that the act of donation 
has “revealed” a transcendent dimension of knowledge, a “wisdom…resonat*ing+ 
through” the students and forging trans-individual networks of debt and gratitude 
between donor, doctor and future patients. In a similar vein, another tribute 
proposes that donation may create a profound yet impersonal relationship between 
the students and the donor’s family: “Whilst we too will never know each other, 
perhaps this single act of utmost generosity will connect us in some way” (14.2). 
   For some students, then, dissection transmits not just scientific but also ethical 
knowledge. The ethical epistemic mode is structured as an active pedagogy which 
moulds students to become more like the donor, viewed as the symbolic bearer of 
ethical universals which transcend any one individual, and impels them to 
demonstrate the same qualities in their future professional practice. Typically the 
structure of this epistemic mode is implicit, embedded in statements which attempt 
to convey to the donor’s family the value of the gift the students have received. 
Occasionally, however, a tribute steps back to engage in explicit reflection on the 
epistemological transformation wrought by the experience of dissection. The 
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following quotation represents perhaps the closest the tributes come to abstract 
epistemology: 
 
“You gave us an appreciation of the humanity of medicine, how thought 
can and should be given at every stage in life and how understanding can 
transcend the constraints of biology. You gave us an appreciation of the 
lengths some will go for perfect strangers beyond that of simple 
circumstance. As such, you have made us realise something that should 
be inherent to man: the gift of giving.” (16.34) 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Constructing Medical Knowledge, Constituting Medical Subjects 
   The theme of ‘not knowing the donor’ in the tributes is the occasion for reflections 
with complex epistemological implications. Many of the tributes bear witness to the 
unease occasioned by the disjunction between two modes of knowledge which we 
have labelled ‘personal’ and ‘scientific’. The former operates as a bidirectional 
exchange between epistemological equals, and synthetically approaches the person 
at the level of its indivisible wholeness. The latter, which we might approximately 
identify with the ‘medical gaze’ analysed by Foucault,25 relies on an irreversible 
distinction between knowing subject and known object, and analytically interrogates 
the organism at the level of its organs, tissues and cells. Some tributes attempt to 
avoid such unease by eliding this disjunction; others suggest that dissection is 
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pedagogically valuable precisely because it makes the student intensely aware of the 
coexistence of these two domains within the human, in a way that no textbook could 
replicate, and thereby gives scientific knowledge meaning and direction. Yet others 
reflect on the significance of donation as such to elaborate a third, ethical mode of 
knowledge. Such knowledge is structured as an active, transformative pedagogy, 
breaching the subject/object boundary to mould the student in the donor’s image, 
and attempts to convey abstract universals of which the individual can merely be the 
symbolic representation. If successful, this transformation will create trans-individual 
networks under the sign of an impersonal generosity, the lodestar of the students’ 
future medical practice.  
   The tension between personal and scientific epistemic modes in the tributes seems 
likely to reflect the transitional position of medical students as they are interpellated 
into a new subjectivity and inserted into a new regime of knowledge.32 Dissection 
acts as a training in epistemology, the constitution of a new epistemic subject. In the 
dissection room, the student is not only learning the attachments of biceps brachii, 
nor even how to control their emotions, but also how to regard human beings with 
the analytic gaze of science.  
   Though scientific and personal modes of knowledge rub shoulders in some 
tributes, the centrality of the theme of ‘not knowing the donor’ to these reflections 
bears witness to the sharp distinction between them. The rhetorical figures of 
antithesis and paradox which organise the appearances of this theme, the assertions 
of knowing “nothing” about the donor, the very awkwardness of the attempts to 
elide the gulf between the way the students and the families know them: all this 
suggests that these epistemic modes confront each other as radical opposites within 
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the overall ecology of knowledge in the tributes. Even if the two modes can be 
secondarily yoked together, such that scientific knowledge is placed in the service of 
care of the person, they remain fundamentally distinct at the structural level; 
nothing in the tributes suggests that they might be related to each other as poles of 
a continuum rather than discontinuous categories. 
   Dissection thus not only defines a scientific mode of knowledge, but works to 
foreclose any possibility of overlap between scientific and personal modes. The 
students learn that knowing someone as an organism is structurally quite different 
from knowing them as a person, that the forms of statement available to a doctor 
are radically distinct from those available to a layperson. This message is powerfully 
conveyed by the withholding of all biographical information about the donor save 
what is potentially relevant to anatomical investigation. In this regard, dissection 
constitutes the medical professional as a subject who cannot relate personally to the 
objects of her knowledge, by the very epistemic structure which defines her as a 
medical subject. The encounter with the donor does not simply act as an emotionally 
challenging experience through which students learn to regulate and suppress their 
feelings: it constructs a relation in which emotion is foreclosed. A personal relation 
entails bidirectional exchange of knowledge and affect between (potential) 
epistemic equals; the scientific relation elaborated in the dissection room is one of 
epistemological mastery, in which the subject of the medical gaze analytically 
disassembles its object into component parts but is not itself subject to affect. 
   While the irreversibility of subject and object of scientific knowledge leaves the 
subject essentially unchanged by its investigation, the ethical subject visible in some 
tributes explicitly narrates itself as transformed or even constituted by the 
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experience of dissection. Rather than a relation of mastery, the ethical subject is 
imagined as the donor’s student; but beyond this relation of seniority, the more 
fundamental relationship is one of equality on the basis of shared abstract qualities 
held to pertain to the human as such. It is these shared qualities which underwrite 
the reciprocal exchanges imagined between donor, doctor and patients: the donor 
may be the teacher, but if the lesson succeeds, the student will herself become like 
the donor (and perhaps one day pass the lesson on to others). Scientific knowledge 
as it appears in the tributes is a relation of mastery subtended by essential, 
irreversible difference between subject and object; ethical knowledge is a relation of 
transformation subtended by essential similarity. 
 
Pedagogy and Practice 
   What is the significance of these findings for the future professional practice of 
medical students who learn anatomy by dissection? Insofar as social practice 
emerges from and is structured by discourse, it seems plausible that the regime of 
pure scientific knowledge may reproduce itself in clinical practice, resulting in a 
relationship between doctor and patient of impersonal technical rationality. Those 
patients who accept this status may be considered ‘good patients’, whereas those 
who resist it by insisting on their irreducibility to an organism or presenting with 
‘social’ problems may be labelled ‘bad patients’, with evident implications for 
delivery of care.33 At its most extreme, this epistemic relation might contribute to 
the experiences of dehumanisation and reification to which patients are sometimes 
subjected.12 Conversely, we might expect that those tributes embodying a relation 
between student and donor which is structured as a profound exchange between 
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two human beings may correspond to more humane clinical practice, with the 
doctor-patient relationship structured as an interaction of equals on the basis of 
shared humanity.34 
   If the strategic divergence between scientific and ethical epistemic modes in the 
tributes may perhaps represent one root of the divergence between technical and 
humanistic models of medical professionalism, the epistemological work which takes 
place in the dissection room emerges as a profoundly important – if hitherto 
somewhat neglected – terrain for investigation and pedagogical regulation. Medical 
schools have long engaged in the explicit teaching of ‘professionalism’, 
encompassing behaviours, identities and attitudes; but in [deleted] at least, such 
teaching is delivered only in the clinical part of the course. Our analysis of the 
tributes suggests that in fact such professional education is already taking place from 
the very beginning of a medical degree, in an implicit and subconscious fashion as 
part of the ‘hidden curriculum’. We might even question whether teaching of 
professionalism and communication skills during the clinical part of a medical degree 
is in effect attempting to unpick epistemological structures and identities learnt in 
the earlier, preclinical part of the course. Conversely, medical students at 
universities which have moved away from traditional dissection as a method of 
teaching anatomy may construct substantively different medical subjectivities in 
response to their different experiences. Our dataset does not permit us to determine 
to what extent the epistemic modes visible in the tributes are elaborated by 
students individually in response to their experiences in the dissection room, and to 
what extent they are transmitted by the circulation of formal or informal social 
discourses. However, we would suggest that more attention to the epistemology of 
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dissection is warranted, both in the academic literature and in pedagogical practice. 
If a doctor is (at least in part) a subject of medical knowledge, we must ask what 
kinds of knowing are desirable, and to what ends. 
   The implications of our analysis for anatomical education are broad. While 
previous studies highlighting the use of problematic emotional regulation strategies 
such as the ‘cadaver story’ have been addressed by modern constructs of 
‘professionalism’, there has been little formal attempt to regulate the modes of 
knowledge developed in the dissection room.19, 21 The tributes bear witness to the 
power of cadaveric dissection to institute profoundly reflective and ethical ways of 
relating to donors, but also to the risk that more distancing and ultimately 
dehumanising forms of relation may emerge. Although our pre-clinical dataset does 
not allow us to trace how the modes of knowledge established in the dissection 
room impact on later clinical practice, we may speculate that the relation to the ‘first 
patient’ is likely to be a formative one, and hence of critical importance for 
exploration and regulation. Encouraging students to interrogate the new forms of 
knowledge and relation they are developing, the lenses they deploy to examine their 
donors, may eventually promote reflective practice and a clinical ethics which goes 
beyond simple ‘professionalism’. 
   Ultimately, we would recommend that both scientific and ethical modes of 
knowledge are of value in clinical practice, and that the doctor must be able to adopt 
both technical and humanistic stances depending on the requirements of the 
moment. There will be times when doctors will need to view patients primarily as 
bodies with problems which require solutions, and other times when they are to be 
respected profoundly yet impersonally as the bearers of an abstract humanity. 
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Modern medicine requires of course that all doctors be able to regard their patients 
with the analytic eye of science; but if this is the only lens available, the clinical 
encounter will be impoverished indeed. Perhaps, then, medical education should 
incorporate explicit epistemological reflection on each component of the curriculum, 
with the aim of producing doctors capable of knowing their patients diversely and 
generously. 
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